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Neighbours of the neighbours 
 
EU 28/27 
lnfluential neighbouring states Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey 
Conflicts of values and interests 
Eastern Partnership Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine 
Southern Neighbourhood Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Westbank including East-Jerusalem and Gaza 
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The project initiative „Key States“ – An introduction  
In pursuing its objective of building a ring of stable states to the east and south of its borders from Belarus to  
Morocco, the European Union must recognise that the room for manoeuvre in its neighbourhood has become 
narrower. Four states in particular are playing an ever more active role: Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
They are increasingly influencing the EU's immediate neighbours, many of whom are also their immediate  
geographical neighbours. From a European perspective, these four large countries can also be described as 
"neighbours of the EU's neighbours" and "key states" in relation to the European neighbourhood.  
The governments of these four key states use their power to shape political and social developments in the  
common neighbourhood according to their own foreign policy principles and norms. Their objectives are not  
always in line with the European Union's stabilisation and transformation activities. Therefore, the success of EU 
policies in its neighbourhood regions increasingly depends on a better understanding of the interests and values 
of these four states, as well as on the conclusions that Brussels and the EU Member States derive from these 
findings for their own policy strategies. The interactions between the key countries themselves also provide  
leeway for European neighbourhood policy. 
To this end, the Bertelsmann Stiftung's programme “Europe’s Future” has set up a strategy group as part of the 
"Strategies for EU Neighbourhood" project. Its members are independent experts with in-depth knowledge of 
these four relevant countries, international relations and European foreign and neighbourhood policy. The  
members of the strategy group are: 
 Michael Bauer, expert on the international relations of the Middle East, MEIA Research 
 Christian-P. Hanelt, expert on the Middle East, Bertelsmann Stiftung 
 Wilfried Jilge, expert on Central and Eastern Europe, Berlin 
 Dr. Christian Koch, expert on the Arab Gulf countries, Gulf Research Center 
 Miriam Kosmehl, expert on Central and Eastern Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung 
 Dr. Stefan Meister, expert on Central and Eastern Europe, German Council on Foreign Relations 
 Almut Möller, expert on European affairs, European Council on Foreign Relations 
 Adnan Tabatabai, expert on Iran, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient 
 Prof. Dr. Erdal Yalcin, expert on economic affairs and Turkey, Konstanz University of Applied Sciences 
The members of the Strategy Group participate as private individuals. The opinions expressed in this paper there-
fore do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the institutions to which the individual members belong. 
The Strategy Group is deliberately confining itself initially to the four key states mentioned. They are neighbours 
of the EU neighbourhood covered by the ENP to date and have more direct influence than the US and China due 
to their geographical proximity and history. It is not to be overlooked in this context that China's role in this region, 
with its "Silk Road / Belt and Road Initiative" and its dialogue format 1 + 16 (China plus five Western Balkan  
countries and eleven EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, without the EU), has grown significantly.  
The analysis presented here answers three key questions: 
(1) What are the strategic goals of the key states Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and what interests and  
values guide their actions at the international level and vis-à-vis the EU? 
(2) What links and interdependencies exist between the four key states?  
(3) What initial conclusions can be drawn for European policy from the constellations of interests, relationships and 
actors in the key states? 
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1 Strategic objectives, foreign policy interests and values of key states 
Socio-economic, political and defence policy data are listed in three tables in the appendix. 
1.1 Russia as a global power 
The Russian leadership questions the security order in Europe negotiated after the end of the East-West conflict 
and wants to renegotiate its role as a great international power. The Russian elites look at the global order in terms 
of a neo-realist paradigm: large states are more sovereign than small states, only states without allies are truly 
sovereign, in international relations there can only be "win-lose" but not "win-win" situations, interdependence  
creates dependencies and weakens one's own agency. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the only 
body that can decide on international issues. In the spirit of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, Moscow wants a 
concert of great powers that will decide on international issues and on crisis resolutions mechanisms. In this  
respect, the Russian model of order is diametrically opposed to that of Germany and the EU. The EU has an  
interest in strengthening multilateral institutions and legalising international relations – so that the "rule of law"  
rather than the "law of the most powerful" applies. 
The linchpin of Russian foreign policy thinking is the so-called "West" and thus the USA and its allies. Their  
actions and non-actions influence the foreign policy scope of the Russian leadership. They close or open spaces 
that Moscow is using more and more skilfully to assert its own interests. In this context, the "colour revolutions" in 
the post-Soviet states and the "Arab Spring" are interpreted as developments largely staged and supported by 
the USA and its allies with the aim of overthrowing stable but authoritarian leaderships. The overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq in 2003 and Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 were shocks for Russia's power elites. President 
Putin saw himself as a possible target of such a US-led "destabilisation policy" in the Middle East. This was one 
of the reasons Putin intervened in the Syrian war in 2015 in order to prevent Bashar al-Assad from falling from 
power. Further arguments the Kremlin brought forward for the intervention are the prevention of the further desta-
bilization in the Middle East region and the countering of the spread of radical Islamism into post-Soviet space.  
Russian foreign policy lacks the kind of "soft power" to effectively offer an attractive and alternative concept of 
political order internationally and in its own neighbourhood. The Russian economy in particular is too weak for 
this. After several years of recession, which even led to a contraction of the Russian economy in 2015 and 2016, 
the country recorded a real economic growth rate of 1.55 percent in 2017. However, this is too little for a country 
with an economy more like that of an emerging market country and a gross domestic product similar to that of 
Italy. Russia's central power resource is ultimately its "hard power", reflected in its military capacities, in particular 
its possession of nuclear weapons, its willingness to intervene militarily, its role as an important arms exporter, 
and its central position in international energy markets. 
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1.2 Turkey: Central power and candidate for EU membership 
Turkey is the key country that is most closely linked economically and politically with the EU. Turkey is the only 
one of the four countries to be a member of NATO and has the status of an EU candidate country, although at 
present there no longer seems to be any prospect of accession. Political relations between Ankara and the  
European capitals have cooled off considerably, with both parties blaming each other for this development.  
As relations between the EU and Turkey have deteriorated since 2009, the foreign policy priorities between  
Brussels and Ankara have begun to diverge. Turkey's membership in the customs union with the EU (since 1996) 
is increasingly being criticised, as Ankara sees Turkish foreign trade interests as being insufficiently taken into 
account in the European Commission's negotiations on trade agreements with third countries. The Turkish govern-
ment wants to see the customs union extended to agricultural goods, services and public tenders. However, at 
the end of June 2018, the EU decided not to negotiate a deepening of the customs union with Turkey at this point 
in time. This is due to the (1) the violation of the rule of law and democratic principles and (2) the transformation 
of the parliamentary system of government by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling AK party into a 
strong presidential system in recent years. In the run-up to the referendum to introduce the presidential system, 
President Erdogan used escalating rhetoric to bind Turkish or Turkish-born exile communities in Europe to the 
Turkish state. This has further contributed to the cooling off Turkey's bilateral relations with some EU Member 
States such as Germany, the Netherlands and France. 
Nevertheless, the Turkish economy is mainly import- and export-oriented and relies on access to international 
and regional markets. That is why the Turkish leadership is increasingly focusing its foreign policy on countries 
from which energy can be imported at reasonable costs, from where investments can be attracted and to where 
Turkish products can be exported. Turkey's geographical location also makes it a strategic transit country for oil 
and gas supplies between the EU and the countries of the Caucasus, the Middle East and Russia. Turkey's eco-
nomic growth under the AKP government has contributed significantly to President Erdogan's political success. 
This makes the massive rise in the inflation rate from around 9 % in 2016 to over 15 percent in 2018 and the  
resulting problems for the Turkish economy and consumers all the more difficult. The sharp fall of the Turkish lira 
on the international financial markets in August 2018 further exacerbated the situation. 
In terms of security policy, Turkey faces an unstable situation in its southern neighbourhood. In the wake of the 
Syrian civil war, some 3.5 million Syrians sought refuge in Turkey, which poses considerable political and socio-
economic challenges for the country. After the collapse of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process in Turkey in 2014, 
the strengthening of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria since 2015, and the referendum in Kurdish Northern Iraq 
in 2017, Ankara is determined to counter Kurdish aspirations for state autonomy in the Middle East including the 
use of military force. Ankara is particularly concerned about the rising international recognition of Syrian and Iraqi 
Kurdish militias, which successfully contributed to stopping the rapid expansion of the so-called "Islamic State 
(IS)" by military means and subsequently were able to bring territory under their own control. The Turkish military 
invasion and occupation of parts of Northern Syrian and Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq have followed 
this "containment" strategy. 
Furthermore, Turkey considers itself more and more a "central power" in the Middle East. The construction of  
military bases in Qatar and on a Sudanese island in the Red Sea is in line with this ambition. As a major military 
power – also within NATO – Turkey has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to act and is currently modernising its 
military arsenal. Ankara is thus becoming an increasingly important player in the numerous regional conflicts. 
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1.3 Iran: Modernisation pressure and regional influence 
For the compromise-oriented forces in the Iranian leadership around President Hassan Rouhani, the international 
nuclear agreement that the country concluded in 2015 with the veto powers of the UN Security Council, Germany 
and the EU (E3/EU+3 or P5+1)1 was essential to break out of international isolation and initiate a normalization of 
political and economic relations with Europe and other international actors. After years of sanctions, there is a strong 
need for modernisation in almost all sectors of the Iranian economy. The majority of the population is young and 
highly educated and demands an opening-up towards the West, not only in terms of Western lifestyle, but also with 
regard to more opportunities for one's own professional and personal development. Many Iranians see these hopes 
buried by the socio-economic consequences of the new sanctions resulting from President Donald Trump's with-
drawal from the nuclear agreement. The hardliners in Iran, on the other hand, have received a boost; they have 
always been very critical of international agreements with the West and Trump's decision confirms their belief that 
the US in particular cannot be trusted. They are also convinced that a policy of strength is the only sensible secu-
rity policy strategy for Iran. President Trump's surprising announcement offering talks with Iran at the end of July, 
however, has been met with mistrust from both the Revolutionary Guards and the moderate forces. 
Iran's foreign and security policy is characterised by a profound ambivalence: On the one hand, it feels threatened 
in its territorial and political sovereignty because of past military attacks by Russia, Great Britain and Iraq against 
Iran and because the American intelligence agency CIA, together with the British MI-6, overthrew the democrati-
cally elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 to install the Shah regime. On the other hand, some 
countries perceive Iran as a revisionist force that is trying to massively expand its own influence and strive for re-
gional domination. The ambiguity is particularly evident in Iranian policies in the Middle East, which Tehran itself 
perceives as aimed at keeping rivals and enemies at bay. In this sense, the Iranian leadership considers both its 
military engagement in the fight against the so-called "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria and Iran's military interven-
tion on the side of its ally, the Syrian regime, to be defensive.  
However, a number of neighbouring countries perceive Iran's regional policy design as aggressive and – above  
all by Israel and Saudi Arabia – as threatening. In this regard, Iran's cooperation with non-state and paramilitary 
actors – first and foremost with the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Hashd al-Shaabi, the "People's Mobilization 
Units (PMU)" in Iraq – is considered particularly troubling. Iran supports these two fractions financially, politically 
and with military equipment. Critics argue that the strengthening of these units weakens state structures in the 
countries of the Middle East. Teheran on the other hand argues that these forces could support weak statehood. 
These examples show how often perspectives differ or even contradict each other. 
Iran is among the world's richest countries in terms of oil and natural gas and has therefore great economic  
potential. However, the Iranian economy is under great pressure to modernize: the high inflation and unemploy-
ment rates of 12.1 and 13.1 percent respectively, the low GDP/per capita of USD 5,305 compared to the other 
key countries, and the comparably modest and massively declining real economic growth of 3.46 percent high-
light this challenge. The weakness of the economy increases the socioeconomic discontent of large sections of 
the population. There are strikes and demonstrations in some of the provinces. As a result, parts of the public 
have repeatedly criticised Iran's regional policy as too costly. 
 
                                                     
1  The abbreviation "E3/EU+3" refers to the United Kingdom, France, Germany plus the United States, Russia and China and the EU High 
Representative. It was coined in the context of diplomatic activities towards Iran. "P5+1" refers to the same group of states, naming the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. 
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1.4 Saudi Arabia: Fundamental transformation in domestic and foreign policy 
Saudi Arabia's political power architecture is currently in a transitional phase in which a new generation of princes 
is about to replace the old generation that has ruled since the foundation of the modern kingdom. King Salman 
Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud is the last of the founder's sons to possess the throne. With the Crown Prince, King Salman's 
son Mohammed Bin Salman, a generation follows that has an ambitious and less consensual political approach. 
Domestically, a socio-economic reform programme is underway ("Saudi Vision 2030") that will not only funda-
mentally change the economic base of the kingdom, but also terminate the country's social contract, which based 
internal stability on subsidies and tax exemption for all citizens. Externally, the new generation of leaders no 
longer feels bound to the traditional, consensus-oriented and cautious foreign policy style of their predecessors. 
The reorientation of Saudi security policy has had particularly dramatic consequences in Yemen. Since 2015, the 
kingdom has been leading a military intervention there to support Yemeni President Hadi in the civil war with the 
Houthi rebels, who are said to be supported by Iran. 
The new leadership in Riyadh sees no alternative to this strategic realignment given that the geostrategic situation 
in the Middle East has changed catastrophically for Saudi Arabia since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and with 
the upheavals following the "Arab Spring" in 2011. The Saudi monarchy has stood by while Iran has steadily ex-
panded its influence in the region, largely at the expense of Riyadh. Long-standing allies such as the Egyptian 
President Mubarak fell within a few weeks. In addition, Riyadh saw Iran strengthened as a result of the nuclear 
agreement – cancelled by US President Trump in May 2018 – given that it initiated Iran's international rehabilitation 
and thereby enhanced Tehran's strategic and political ambitions and influence. Riyadh accuses Tehran of exploi- 
ting conflicts such as the Syrian civil war and the war in Yemen, as well as the unstable situation in countries 
such as Iraq and Lebanon, to increase Iran's political influence through direct military engagement and/or by 
strengthening local allies or militias (so-called "proxies"). 
The kingdom felt abandoned by its key ally, the United States, under the Obama administration, especially as far 
as Iran was concerned. Moreover, the fracking boom in North America made the USA a potential competitor for 
Saudi Arabia in international energy markets. While Saudi Arabia still considers the US protection shield essential 
for its own security, Riyadh is also seeking to expand its strategic options. While Saudi Arabia is determined to 
improve US-Saudi relations with President Trump following the alienation under the Obama presidency, Saudi 
politicians consider the unpredictability and transactional character of the Trump administration to be problematic. 
Saudi Arabia simply cannot afford to continue with the USA as usual, according to many in Riyadh. 
Measured in terms of GDP per capita, Saudi Arabia is in a stronger position than the other three key states. The 
country is one of the major players in the international energy sector. However, the negative economic growth 
that has persisted since 2015 (2017 = -0.74 percent) underlines that the kingdom still lacks sustained economic 
momentum. This is because the Saudi economy continues to remain too dependent on oil exports (90% of the 
country's income is generated by oil). It remains to be seen whether the reform agenda of Crown Prince Mohammed 
Bin Salman, the aforementioned “Saudi Vision 2030”, will have the desired effects and make the Saudi economy 
more efficient and independent of oil and gas. The current course of political centralism and economic decentrali-
zation certainly shows a number of contradictions that Riyadh will have to face in the near future. 
Saudi Arabia holds a leading position internationally in terms of absolute and relative military expenditure. With 
ever-increasing expenditure on arms imports, Riyadh is not only modernizing its own military arsenal, but is also 
consolidating existing alliances and building new ones. For instance, Saudi arms purchases of up to USD 350 billion 
were agreed with US President Trump during his state visit in 2017 for the coming years. From Russia, Riyadh 
wants to acquire the state-of-the-art S-400 air defence system and other military equipment. 
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2 Relations and interdependencies, conflicts and cooperation  
between the key states 
A number of challenges affect the EU's relationship with these four key states in its neighbourhood. However,  
relations between Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran are equally characterised by a complex network of  
cooperation and conflict. Especially in the Balkans, the Eastern EU neighbourhood and the Mediterranean/Gulf 
region, these key states compete for resources, power and influence not only with the EU, but also with each 
other. Their relationships are characterised by realpolitik and/or power politics, as well as by mistrust of one  
another. Awareness and understanding these changing alliances and rivalries provides the EU with the oppor-
tunity for openings in terms of applying its foreign and security policy in dealing with the key states. 
Matrix of Interests and Issues 
  Russia with  Turkey with  Iran with  Saudi Arabia with  
Russia  
 
 Trade / Energy sector  
 Syria / Kurds  
 Black Sea region  
 Balkans  
 Caucasus 
 Arms acquisitions 
 Iranian nuclear agreement  
 UN Security Council  
 Syria  
 Trade / Energy sector  
 Arms acquisitions 
 Caucasus 
 Oil price / output 
 Iranian nuclear agreement 
 Syria 
 Arms acquisitions 
Turkey   Trade / Energy sector 
 Syria  
 Caucasus 
 Black Sea region 
 Distance to USA / Nato  
 Arms exports 
 
 Trade 
 Energy sector 
 Syria 
 Iraq 
 Caucasus 
 Syria  
 Muslim Brotherhood / Qatar 
 Trade 
 Iraq 
Iran   Syria 
 Iranian nuclear agreement 
 Trade / Energy sector  
 Arms exports 
 Caucasus 
 Trade / Energy sector 
 Syria / Kurds 
 Iraq / Kurds  
 Iranian nuclear agreement 
 
 Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar, 
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq  
 Sunni Shia divide  
 Iranian nuclear agreement  
 Pilgrimage regulations 
Saudi Arabia   Oil price / output 
 Arms exports 
 Iranian nuclear agreement  
 Syria 
 Trade / Energy sector 
 Syria / Kurds 
 Qatar / Muslim Brotherhood 
 American-Israeli-Saudi  
alliance  
 Pilgrimage regulations 
 Oil price / output 
 
 
2.1 Turkish-Iranian relations 
The Turkish-Iranian relationship has proven to be largely "conflict-prone" in recent decades and is characterised 
by sustained realpolitik.  
Political differences have been recurring, especially with regard to the Syrian conflict. Yet, these were openly and 
explicitly addressed in both capitals. Neither on a political nor on a society level, can a rhetoric be found that could 
evoke an exaggerated rivalry or even enmity between these states. The traditionally stable trade relations, visa-
free travel, the long common border and the fact that about 40 percent of the Iranian population speaks Turkish 
dialects forms a solid social basis that does not appear to give rise to intensive conflicts even among the political 
elites.  
Iran was one of the first states to publicly side with the Erdogan government after the military coup in 2016. The 
crisis around the Gulf Emirate of Qatar, which has been escalating since June 2017, has also brought the coun-
tries closer together – both of them are benefiting from Qatari investments. The common rejection of Kurdish 
statehood ambitions is also unifying. There are, however, clear differences with regard to the means of curbing a 
Kurdish rise in power. Iran, for example, strongly criticises Turkey's military incursion into northern Syria.  
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Economic interests dominate relations between Ankara and Tehran. The import of oil and gas from Iran is of  
particular importance for Turkey, as the country is dependent on energy imports. A significant part of Turkey's 
large trade deficit can be ascribed to the high amount of energy imports. In addition, Turkey has a strong interest 
in expanding its export business to Iran and securing the involvement of Turkish companies in major Iranian  
projects. Iran, on the other hand, depends on market opportunities for its energy resources and needs partners 
and investors who can contribute to the modernization of the Iranian economy. The re-establishment of compre-
hensive American economic and financial sanctions against Iran following the US withdrawal from the nuclear 
agreement will significantly hamper the economic policy objectives of both states. Turkey had welcomed the  
nuclear agreement with Iran because the abolition of sanctions created a legal basis for the development of  
Turkish-Iranian economic relations and at the same time curbed Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
2.2 Iranian-Russian relations 
Moscow's military intervention in the Syrian war forms the most important basis for the close ties between Russia 
and Iran. Nevertheless, the relationship is not free of contradictions; neither the Soviet Union nor Russia ever 
gained Iran's trust. The scepticism dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, when Russian bombs destroyed 
the first Iranian parliament. Although Russia's veto thwarted numerous UN Security Council Resolutions against 
Iran, the opposite was also often the case with Russia contributing time and again to sanctions against Iran. That 
is why nobody in Iran speaks of relations with Russia in alliance terms, despite the common Syria policy and 
Moscow's support for the nuclear agreement.  
However, since the beginning of 2018 there have been signs of an expansion of relations: Iranian Defence  
Minister Amir Hatami attended a Moscow Security Conference; the Education Ministers of both countries agreed 
to include Farsi as a foreign language in Russia and Russian as a foreign language in Iran in the curricula; the  
conservative cleric and Rouhani challenger Ebrahim Raisi visited Orthodox clergy in the Russian city of Kazan. 
Russia wants to secure its military bases on the Syrian Mediterranean coast with a reduced use of resources. 
Moscow's Middle East policy is guided by flexibility and pragmatism, and the Russian perspective on Iran reflects 
this, especially in regard to the war in Syria: Moscow and Tehran agree on the rejection of any regime change 
policy and the goal of ensuring the continued existence of Bashar al-Assad's Syrian regime. Without Iran and the 
Lebanese Hezbollah militia, Russia could not have helped al-Assad achieve a military breakthrough.  
With regard to Syria's future, however, interests between the two countries seem to differ: Moscow favours a  
centralist, secular and military-dominated state. In the medium to long term, Moscow does not view itself tied to 
al-Assad as ruler. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, on the other hand, are committed to maintaining the leader-
ship of al-Assad, as well as their own militias and power bases. As Iran is more present on the ground in Syria, 
Moscow subsequently cannot assert all of its interests against Tehran.  
For Russia, the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear agreement in the E3/EU+3 (P5+1) format were an opportunity 
to demonstrate Moscow's international capacity to act. Russian companies are active both in the nuclear sector 
as well as in the development of oil and gas fields in Iran. Iran is also an important recipient of Russian weapons 
– even though arms trade with Iran has remained subject to international controls and restrictions even after the 
nuclear agreement. 
US President Trump's stance on Iran will further help to keep Tehran's ties with Moscow closely aligned despite 
differences over Syria's future. Russia does not want a nuclear-armed neighbour Iran and is therefore interested 
in maintaining the nuclear agreement. Moreover, the Kremlin fears that an end to the agreement could weaken 
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Iran's moderate forces, allow hardliners to restart the nuclear programme without any outside controls as well as 
intensify Iran’s expansionary regional policy. In the Kremlin's view, this would complicate bilateral relations and 
endanger current Russian-Iranian cooperation in the Middle East region.  
The leadership in Tehran also wants to save the agreement, but will need concessions from the other parties to 
the agreement. In the case of Russia, Iran is interested in receiving a certain security dividend – for example the 
Russian veto in the UN Security Council or the assurance that Tehran will not have to give in too much to Israeli 
pressure in the Syrian conflict. 
In this context, there are signs of possible rifts: Against the background of the danger of an intensified Iran-Israeli 
conflict, Moscow's military cooperation with Iran in Syria is not without risk. Russia’s balancing policy includes 
having good relations with Israel. Moscow thus wants to avoid at all costs a confrontation with Israeli military 
power and the financial and military costs associated with it. In the event of an escalating Israeli-Iranian conflict, 
Moscow may be caught between the frontlines, which in turn would undermine its role as mediator in the region 
that the Kremlin seeks. 
2.3 Iranian-Saudi relations 
On the one hand, Iran's view of Saudi Arabia is characterised by a deeply rooted sense of superiority, which still 
keeps Iran's threat perception with regard to Saudi Arabia rather low. In terms of geo-strategy, the country also 
sees an advantage in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia – according to Tehran's estimates – is failing militarily, despite 
having superior armed forces and the support of the USA and Great Britain. Qatar's isolation has also driven the 
rich emirate from Saudi Arabia into Iran's arms with the result that the trade between Iran and Qatar has risen by 
over 100 percent since June 2017.  
On the other hand, there is growing concern in Iran – especially after the termination of the nuclear agreement by 
Washington – that the Saudi government, led by the Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman will continue to pursue 
its regional policy, which Iran characterizes as reckless. Tehran speaks of an "unholy alliance" between Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the overly anti-Iranian team of US President Trump due to public 
statements of government representatives of these countries, which suggest a policy of regime change towards 
Iran. Tehran is concerned that this could lead to destabilisation inside the country, where the intelligence services 
of the USA and Israel, with the help of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, could cause deliberate turmoil in Iran. The Iranian 
leadership is trying to counter this risk by intensifying the presence of the secret services and police. 
For Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, the rivalry with Iran is a permanent feature of its security concerns, which has further 
gained in intensity in recent years. The leadership in Riyadh is convinced that U.S. Middle East policy failures since 
the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, opened the door for Iran to expand its influence regionally to the 
direct disadvantage of the kingdom. From Riyadh's perspective, Iran is fostering state disintegration in the Middle 
East through its support of proxy-militias such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, the Houthi rebels in Yemen or 
various Shiite groups and paramilitaries in Iraq. Saudi Arabia is no longer willing to stand by idly and watch such 
developments. Riyadh sees itself in a defensive position and accordingly justifies military intervention in the neigh-
bourhood. Saudi Arabia is most visibly engaged in Yemen, where it wants to prevent the Houthi rebels, who in 
Riyadh's judgement receive military support and training from Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, from establishing them-
selves as a state within the state along the lines of Hezbollah and from pushing for the permanent disintegration 
of the state in Yemen.  
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The unrest in the region is not, from the kingdom's point of view, simply the result of a historic rivalry conflict with 
Iran. Instead, Riyadh is convinced that Iranian policy is mainly directed against the regional order led by the USA 
with Saudi Arabia simply being part of this order. Saudi Arabia is determined to contain Iran's further advance in 
the region, but it equally fears a military conflict between the US and/or Israel and Iran, which would negatively 
impact the kingdom; including endangering the stability of the Al-Saud family' s own system of rule. The lack of 
communication across regional lines of conflict significantly contributes to the risk of such an escalation. Against 
this background, it cannot be ruled out that Riyadh might once again be willing to engage in dialogue with Tehran 
in the near future. 
2.4 Turkish-Russian relations 
The Turkish-Russian relations have never been free of tension; although ties have improved at the same time that 
Turkey's relations with the EU and the USA have cooled off.  
In Syria, Turkey initially took a firm stand with the rebels, while Russia supported the regime. However, the over-
throw of Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad is no longer a priority of Turkish Syria policy and instead is now primarily 
aimed at preventing the political and military ambitions of the Kurds in northern Syria and northern Iraq. Turkish 
military operations in northern Syria are coordinated at least to some extent with Moscow. Whereas Ankara wants 
to push the Kurds back, they are seen as important actors as far as Moscow's Middle East policy is concerned. 
The Turkish downing of a Russian fighter plane in November 2015 showed that confrontation could escalate in 
Syria. However, after months of strained relations, both states, together with Iran, see themselves as Syria's central 
external powers of order, which are also in a position to undermine the United Nations negotiation process in  
Geneva with their own diplomatic initiatives such as in Sochi and Astana. The improved Russian-Turkish relations 
are also evident in the fact that NATO member Turkey has bought the Russian S-400 air defence system (while 
Iran only receives the S-300 systems in consideration of Israel). 
President Putin's pragmatic policy is more about common grounds than differences and does not ask about politi-
cal and social freedoms; this stands in clear contrast to the critical European attitude the Turkish leadership finds 
itself confronted with. Russia's strategy of flexibility has successfully helped to dissociate Turkey from its Western 
allies. Ankara, on the other hand, sees Russia as a strategic and economic complement to political relations with 
the West and the customs union with the EU, which according to President Erdogan falls short of Turkey's eco-
nomic expectations. The Turkish government is further seen as seeking closer relations with Russia in order to 
put pressure on its Western partners and to take Ankara's wishes more into account, for example with regard to 
the issues of the Kurds, trade and the modernisation of weapons. 
Russia and Turkey are also stepping up their cooperation in the energy sector: Russian natural gas is to flow into 
Turkey via the TurkStream pipeline from the end of 2019. Moscow and Ankara are planning to expand the pipe-
line to south-eastern Europe. This would make Turkey an important transit country for Russian gas to Europe and 
bring it closer to its goal of becoming an energy hub. By combining its energy supplies via TurkStream with the 
NordStream2 pipeline, Russia would in the meantime become less dependent on the transit countries Ukraine 
and Belarus.  
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2.5 Saudi-Turkish relations 
Saudi-Turkish relations are subject to strong fluctuations. In the context of the "Arab Spring", the two countries 
found themselves on opposing sides: Saudi Arabia saw the overthrow of long-standing allies such as the presidents 
of Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia in 2011 as a dramatic weakening of established foreign policy partnerships in the 
Arab world. Turkey, on the other hand, positioned itself as a supporter of the uprisings in North Africa and the 
Middle East, establishing close relations with political representatives of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, whose 
ideology is seen in Saudi Arabia and above all in the United Arab Emirates as a threat to the legitimacy of the ruling 
families. This Turkish-Saudi conflict became apparent when Egyptian President Mursi, a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, was overthrown in the summer 2013, and intensified as Turkey and Qatar expanded their coopera-
tion while Saudi Arabia and the UAE attempted to isolate the emirate. One of Saudi Arabia's demands to Qatar is 
to close the Turkish military base in Doha. Saudi Arabia is also critical of the expansion of Turkish military influ-
ence in the Red Sea right on Saudi's doorstep, where Ankara is building a military base on a Sudanese island.  
At the start of the Syrian civil war, Saudi Arabia and Turkey found themselves on the same side and initially sup-
ported the uprising against Bashar al-Assad. Both were disappointed by the passive attitude of the US under the 
leadership of then President Obama and began to support various rebel groups in Syria. Since then, however, the 
priorities of the two states have shifted. While Saudi Arabia primarily wants to counter Iranian influence in Syria 
and still considers a fall of Bashar al-Assad as desirable, Turkey is primarily interested in curbing the political and 
strategic ambitions of the Kurds in northern Syria. In this context, Ankara is dependent on coordination with  
Russia and Iran, Saudi Arabia's competitor.  
Despite the difficult relationship, however, the importance of Turkey's role for Saudi Arabia in the overall strategic 
situation of the Middle East should not be underestimated: Like Saudi Arabia, Turkey is an Islamic-Sunni country 
that Riyadh views as a possible counterweight to Shiite Iran and a bulwark against Tehran's expansionism.  
2.6 Saudi-Russian relations 
Saudi Arabia and Russia are upgrading their bilateral relations motivated by political and economic considerations: 
Given Riyadh’s mistrust of the ambitions and unreliability of the US administrations, Saudi Arabia is keen to diver-
sify its security partnerships. This means it cannot ignore Russia due to Moscow's strong role in the Middle East 
region. Although and precisely because Russia is on the opposite side to Riyadh in the Syrian conflict and in the 
Saudi-Iranian rivalry, Saudi Arabia sees a need for clarification. The royal family does not regard the constellation 
of interests in Moscow and Tehran as being in any way identical. In addition, there is a hope that Russia will have 
a moderating influence on Iran's regional ambitions.  
A major focus of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Riyadh lies in the economic field, especially in the 
expansion of energy cooperation. Since 2016, Russia and Saudi Arabia have been working together to regulate 
oil production, as both countries are benefiting from a stable oil price in view of their current economic situation. 
With its announcement to buy Russian weapons, such as the modern Russian air defence system S-400, Saudi 
Arabia combines economic and security considerations. At the same time, the procurement of Western, especially 
American, military goods remains a priority for the kingdom. 
Saudi Arabia's efforts to establish cooperative relations with Russia are complemented by the diplomatic initiatives 
of the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi has also intensified its cooperation with Moscow and even entered into a 
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"Strategic Partnership" with Russia in June 2018. The UAE wants to counter the efforts of its rival Qatar, which is 
also deepening its economic and political relations with Russia.  
For Russia, the growing interest of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar provides a welcome opportunity to promote 
investment in its own economy and gain access to the energy and military sectors of these states. Economic alter-
natives are of strategic importance for Russia in the light of Western sanctions imposed because of the Russian 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the continued fighting in parts of eastern Ukraine. The rivalry between 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and Qatar on the other is an advantage for Russia, as both sides are 
vying for Moscow's favour through investment promises from their sovereign wealth funds, without demanding a 
clear positioning of the Kremlin for their interests. In line with its "flexible Middle East policy", Moscow would 
hardly be prepared to do this in any case. Furthermore, the expansion of political relations with the Arab Gulf 
states in general, and with Saudi Arabia in particular, fits into Russia's underlying strategy of consolidating and 
expanding its own influence while at the same time weakening the role and alliances of the USA. A new element 
of the cooperation is the closer coordination between Russia and OPEC in setting oil production quotas. For the 
first time, the talks between Riyadh and Moscow appear to have led to a coordinated policy of reducing production 
levels. 
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Thematic map of the EU with the “neighbours of the neighbours”: Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
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3 “The neighbours of the EU's neighbours”: Challenges for the EU 
and its member states 
While formulating their political strategies towards Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the EU and its member 
states must take a closer look at these states' values, interests, perceptions and policy objectives. This applies in 
particular to the formulation of the European Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy in the Balkans, Eastern  
Europe, the Black Sea region and the Mediterranean area – regions that are also in the neighbourhood of the 
four key states mentioned. A number of aspects need to be taken into account in terms of policy application: 
1. The foreign and security policy priorities of the key states are strongly based on the requirements of 
their own regime security: the political elites in Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia see themselves threat-
ened by external and/or internal enemies. In the case of Russia, this is the alleged encirclement by "the West", 
which the Kremlin also accuses of having initiated and supported the "colour revolutions". Since the coup in 
2016, the Turkish government sees itself threatened by the "Gülen movement" and regards Kurdish ambitions 
in northern Syria and northern Iraq as a challenge to Turkey's territorial integrity. The royal family of Saudi  
Arabia sees itself challenged by the expansion of Iranian influence in the region and by the strengthening of 
the Islamist forces in the context of the "Arab Spring". Iran's leadership is divided between reform-minded and 
ultra-conservative forces; it also fears efforts by the US and its allies to bring about regime change in Tehran.  
 
Relations with the EU and its member states are analysed by the key states against the background of these 
threat scenarios. For them, the question arises as to whether the EU and its member states are exacerbating 
the perceived threat, or whether they offer an opportunity to increase their own security. 
 
2. Foreign and security political thinking in the key states is increasingly shaped by categories of power 
politics such as spheres of influence, hegemonic pretensions and balance of power considerations. Interna-
tional relations are seen as a struggle for power and influence, often following the rules of a zero-sum game. 
Alliances are more of a tactical nature and international institutions primarily serve the promotion of national 
interests and not the application of the rule of law in international relations. The use of military capabilities to 
pursue and enforce political and geostrategic objectives is an important element of the security policy of all 
four key states. Against this background, military capability and the willingness to act are essential power factors. 
 
The EU's difficulty in developing a common profile on foreign and above all security policy issues means that, 
from the perspective of the key states, only the large EU member states, above all France, the still-EU  
member Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, Germany, are ultimately taken seriously as security policy  
actors. The EU itself is hardly a factor in the military calculations of the key states. Only France and Great  
Britain, as veto powers of the UN Security Council and owners of nuclear weapons, play a role in this respect.  
 
The key states believe that EU initiatives aimed at promoting social and economic reforms, respect for human 
rights and democratic political practices in the eastern and southern neighbourhood are motivated by power 
politics: In their eyes, the EU wants to use these soft tools to exert pressure on unwelcome regimes and gain 
influence in the region. The stipulation of a normatively guided European foreign policy is countered by the 
argument that the EU and its member states apply these standards only selectively and that the alleged  
values of the EU are also eroding internally.  
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3. The key states are interested in European investment and positive trade balances with the EU:  
Although Europe is hardly a factor in their security policy calculations, the EU and its member states are very 
important for Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran as an economic area and potential partner for trade, 
investment and technological development. The EU is a valued economic partner for all four "neighbours of 
our neighbours". In this respect, foreign trade stands out above all. European companies are also important as 
investors for the modernisation of the economies of the key countries. Consequently, the EU's economic and 
financial potential offers opportunities for foreign policy influence. In this context, however, it is important to take 
into account China's growing competition, whose leadership does not ask about the rule of law or human rights. 
 
4. The EU Neighbourhood – diverging interests:  
 Balkans: In the Balkans, the Kremlin tries to strengthen national conservative and orthodox forces in Serbia, 
northern Macedonia and the Republika Srpska and to tie them to Russia. With regard to Serbia, the exploi-
tation of the Kosovo issue is very effective. Ankara is attempting to strengthen links between Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Turkey through references to historical connections and concrete economic and political 
initiatives. Saudi Arabia is also present in the Balkans through the construction of mosques. The policies of 
these countries stand therefore in direct competition with the EU's efforts to promote democratic and mar-
ket economy reforms in the Balkans and to prepare the six Balkan countries for EU membership in the 
framework of the European Enlargement Policy.  
 Eastern EU neighbourhood: The EU's Eastern Partnership ("EaP") with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,  
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan competes with Russia's hegemonic approach. Moscow views this format 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an intrusion into the post-Soviet space, which Russia regards as 
"close abroad" and whose states the Kremlin concedes only limited sovereignty. The Russian leadership is 
intent on pursuing a policy of maintaining and creating zones of opacity, corruption and weak statehood in 
order to prevent the countries of the South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova from becoming associated with 
the EU and NATO. This policy conflicts with the interests of the EU to promote the rule of law and good 
governance in the same neighbourhood and to bring the countries of the Eastern Partnership into line with 
the EU's own standards and practices by means of economic integration and modernisation within the 
framework of free trade agreements. 
 Southern EU neighbourhood: The key states also play an important role in the EU's southern neighbour-
hood, beyond Syria, Iraq and the Middle East. In North Africa, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the EU 
support different actors and compete for influence: In Egypt, for example, Moscow seeks to intensify rela-
tions with President Fatah al-Sisi through loans and arms supplies. General al-Sisi himself came to power 
through a military coup supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2013. At that time, he 
ousted the democratically elected President Mursi, who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood and was  
supported by Turkey. Despite questionable human rights policies and repression, al-Sisi has emerged as a 
partner of the Europeans, who in turn believe they need the Egyptian leadership in order to restrict migration. 
In Libya, the EU is still counting on Fayiz al Sarraj as Prime Minister to lead a fragile unity government, 
which came into being following United Nations negotiations at the end of 2015. Together with the UAE 
and Egypt, Russia supports General Khalifa Haftar, one of the strongest military actors in Libya's civil war, 
who controls large parts of eastern Libya and competes with the Sarraj government. Turkey, meanwhile, 
together with Qatar, supports the Party for Justice and Construction, which is associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 
In the early years of the "Arab Spring", the EU’s North Africa policy focused on promoting political and  
economic transformation. Following Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks and increasing refugee and migration 
movements, a policy of strengthening the "resilience of state structures" has come to the fore. Normative 
elements of European policy are largely subordinated to this principle. In practice, European policy in North 
Africa is currently focused primarily on preventing illegal migration across the Mediterranean, including 
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working with players guilty of human rights abuses. The EU thus runs the risk, just like the key states, of 
relying on supposedly "strong men" in the region, whose power stems above all from military strength and 
less from political legitimacy. 
Regardless of the concrete political objectives that the EU pursues in its neighbourhood in the Mediterranean 
and in Eastern Europe, it is clear that an EU Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy not only deals with the 
players and constellations of interests on the ground, but must also take into consideration the influence of the 
neighbours of the European neighbourhood. The growing interest of the key states in shaping the common 
neighbourhood also opens up tactical and sometimes strategic options for local actors to strengthen their  
negotiating position vis-à-vis the EU. 
 
5. The political systems of the four key states, which are authoritarian to varying degrees, allow the respective 
political leaders a high degree of flexibility in the context of their foreign policy. Unlike the EU and its 
member states, the key states can change foreign policy positions and friend/foe relations quickly and without 
major domestic political costs. This is less true for Turkey than for the other three key states. In addition,  
personal factors such as actual or alleged insults of political leaders play an important role in shaping foreign 
relations. The weaker the bureaucratic and administrative underpinning, the more significant the personalisation 
of foreign policy becomes. However, the ability to change and act in foreign and security policy reaches its  
limits when the economic costs and human casualties – for example in connection with military operations 
such as those by Iran and Russia in Syria, Saudi Arabia in Yemen or Russia in Ukraine – become too high. 
 
6. Under President Donald Trump, the US seems to be finally abandoning a foreign policy that recognises  
multilateralism and the reconciliation of interests as important principles. Donald Trump not only poses  
considerable challenges to the transatlantic relationship, but also prompts Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran to reassess the role of the US. In the case of Iran, the withdrawal of the US from the nuclear agree-
ment, combined with harsh political rhetoric and sanctions, has exacerbated Iran's already existing sense of 
threat. While the United States remains Saudi Arabia's most important international ally and security guarantor, 
the leadership in Riyadh does not fully trust President Trump. Due to his erratic foreign policy, the royal family 
is increasingly focusing on its own security priorities. The USA is important for Turkish regional policy, particu-
larly with regard to the measures against the Kurds in northern Syria. The fact that Washington's policy 
fluctuates between military support and disregard for the Kurds is unsettling Ankara. Russia, in the meantime, 
has filled the strategic vacuum that had already arisen under the Obama administration in the Middle East – 
and the Kremlin is unlikely to give up this position for the time being. 
 
Under President Trump, the US will be even less prepared than its predecessors to cooperate with the EU  
and its member states in the Middle East and to pursue a policy towards countries such as Russia and Saudi 
Arabia that is at the minimum in line with shared strategic principles. This is particularly evident at the moment 
in the case of Iran and the American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement. 
 
7. All four key states are dissatisfied with their own status in the regional or international system: From the 
Russian leadership's point of view, Moscow deserves a leading role in the European and international security 
order which is being denied to Russia by the Europeans and above all by the USA. Iran sees itself in the role 
of a regional power in the Gulf and in its wider neighbourhood. Both share an interest in reducing the influence 
of the USA internationally. Following a neo-Ottoman approach, Turkey claims to be a central power in the re-
gion; Saudi Arabia sees itself as a leading power in the Muslim-Arab world and wants to defend or regain this 
position. Against the backdrop of these aspirations, there are also rivalries and conflicts between the key states.  
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These insights could give the EU and its member states a basis for committing the key states to contribute to 
solving regional problems, especially in the neighbourhood. Three initial examples: (1) through greater EU en-
gagement in the conflict zones in the South Caucasus and Moldova, where Moscow currently plays a dominant 
role – and by a further initiative for a peaceful, undivided Ukraine to overcome the continuing low intensity conflict 
there; (2) through talks between Russia and the EU on the future of the al-Assad’s regime in Syria, where Mos-
cow has political leeway to assert its interests, but is not in the position to actually bring the conflict to an end and 
build peace; (3) by a bold diplomatic initiative by the EU to contain conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 
Middle East and the Gulf region through the promotion of a regional system of cooperation and security.2 
The strategy group "Key States / Neighbours of the EU's Neighbours" will continue its work in the coming months 
to identify further concrete opportunities for action for the European Union and supplement this overview paper 
with additional policy briefs. 
                                                     
2  Hanelt, C.-P., Koch, C., A Gulf CEC Could Bring Peace and Greater Security to the Middle East. Bertelsmann Stiftung, July 2015 
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/spotlight_02_2015_ENG.pdf 
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Appendix: Data on key states in the European neighbourhood 
Table 1: Socio-economic data 
Country/ 
Data 
Population,  
 
 
 
July 2017,  
for EU 2016 
Population 
share of age 
group 0-24  
 
forecast  
2020 
Population 
forecast  
 
 
2050 
Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) 
value (2015) 
 
0 = lowest;  
1 = highest value 
Gross  
Domestic  
Product  
 
(Mio. USD) 
  2017 
GDP per cap-
ita (USD, EUR 
for EU-28)  
 
2017 
Average annual 
GDP growth rate 
(real)  
 
2016-2017 
Unemploy-
ment rate % 
 
 
2017; for 
Saudi Arabia: 
2016) 
Inflation-
rate in % 
 
 
April 2018 
Natural Gas, 
proved reserves in 
billion cubic me-
ters (cu m), est. 
Global  
ranking 2017 
Crude Oil proved 
reserves, in Mio. 
Barrel (BBL), est. 
 
Global ranking 
2017/ EU 2016 
Russia 142,257,519 27.6 % 132,730,511 0-804 1,527,469 10,608 +1-55 % 5-2 % 2-8 %  
 
Rank 1 
47,800 
Rank 8 
80,000 
Turkey 80,845,215 40.0 % 95,626,879 0-767 841,206 10,512 +7-05 % 11-0 % 11-4%  
 
Rank 77 
18,490 
Rank 54 
389 
Saudi  
Arabia 
28,571,770 37.5 % 45,056,349 0-847 683,827 21,120 -0-74 % 5-6 % 3-7 %  
 
Rank 5 
8,602 
Rank 2 
266,500 
Iran  82,021,564 36.3 % 93,553,454 0-774 431,920 5,305 + 3-46 % 13-1 % 12-1 % Rank 2 
33,500 
Rank 4  
158,400 
EU-28 510,300,000 - 528,600,000  - 17,578,724 38,000  
(32,700 EUR) 
+2-48 % 7-7 % 1-9 % Rank 23 
1,300  
Rank 22 
5,600  
 
Sources:  
Worldometers http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/iran-population/  
United Nations, DESA/Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2017 (share of population age group 0-24 yrs.) http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/database/index.shtml  
World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund (GDP)  https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_L%C3%A4nder_nach_Bruttoinlandsprodukt 
CIA The World Factbook (Natural Gas) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2253rank.html  
CIA The World Factbook (Crude Oil) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2244rank.html  
Unemployment, Statista https://de.statista.com  (data based on Eurostat and IMF) 
Eurostat http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_structure_and_ageing/de  
Human Development Index http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf  
Doing Business (World Bank) http://www.doingbusiness.org  
World Economic Outlook, April 2018, (inflation-rate), http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD/VEN/EU 
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Table 2: Political data 
Land/ 
Daten 
Transformation  
Status,  
BTI 2018 / 2016 
 
1= lowest score  
10 = highest score 
Political  
Transformation,  
BTI 2018 / 2016 
 
1= lowest score  
10 = highest score 
Economic  
Transformation,  
BTI 2018 / 2016 
 
1 = lowest score  
10 = highest score 
Governance  
Index,  
BTI 2018 / 2016 
 
1= lowest score 
10 = highest score 
Freedom House Index 
Ranking  
(2018) 
 
0=Least Free, 
100=Most Free 
World Press Freedom In-
dex, Reporters Without 
Borders (2018)  
 
Ranking of 
180 states 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
Transparency International 
(2017) 
 
Ranking of 
180 states 
Russia 2018: 5.31 
2016: 5.10 
2018: 4.55 
2016: 4.40 
2018: 6.07 
2016: 5.70 
2018: 3.52 
2016: 3.20 Aggregate Score: 20/100  148 135 
Turkey 2018: 6.17 
2016: 7.30 
2018: 5.55 
2016: 7.30 
2018: 6.79 
2016: 7.40 
2018: 4.72 
2016: 6.10 Aggregate Score: 32/100  157 81 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2018: 4.27 
2016: 4.30 
2018: 2.57 
2016: 2.50 
2018: 5.96 
2016: 6.00 
2018: 3.80 
2016: 3.80 Aggregate Score:   7/100  169 57 
Iran  2018: 3.15 
2016: 3.00 
2018. 2.92 
2016: 3.00 
2018: 3.39 
2016: 3.00 
2018: 2.85 
2016: 2.70 Aggregate Score: 18/100  164 130 
 
Sources:  
Transformation Index BTI, Bertelsmann Stiftung, https://www.bti-project.org/de/startseite/   
Freedom in the World 2018, Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017  
Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International https://www.transparency.de/korruptionsindizes/cpi-2017/cpi-ranking-2017/  
Rangliste der Pressefreiheit 2018, Reporter ohne Grenzen https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/rangliste/2018/  
 
Table 3: Defence policy data 
Country/ 
Data 
Military expenditure in  
Mio. USD in 2017  
Military expenditure share  
of GDP 2017 
Arms exports 2017 in SIPRI  
Trend Indicator Values (TIVs*) in Mio. 
Arms imports 2017 in SIPRI  
Trend Indicator Values (TIVs*) in Mio. 
Russia 66,335 4.3 % 6,148 34 
Turkey 18,190  2.2 % 244 410 
Saudi 
Arabia 
69,413 (estimate) 10.3 % (estimate) - 4,111 
Iran  14,548 3.1 % 10 4 
 
(*) SIPRI’s trend-indicator value (TIV) is a measure of the volume of international transfers of major weapons. The method used to calculate TIV is described at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background#TIV-tables 
Sources: 
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex  
SIPRI Importer / Exporter TIV Tables http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php  
SIPRI Fact Sheet, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017, May 2018 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pdf  
Measuring International Arms Transfers, SIPRI https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS1212.pdf 
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The Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Carl-Bertelsmann-Strasse 256 
33311 Gütersloh 
Telephone +49 5241 81-0 
 
Christian-P. Hanelt, Senior Expert Middle East – Programme Europe's Future 
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Telephone +49 5241 81-81187 
Mobile +49 171 221 8261 
Email  christian.hanelt@bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
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